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Sammendrag 
En standardmodell for eksistensen av et likevektsnivå på arbeidsledighetsraten består av to statiske 
likninger for reallønn som funksjon av blant annet ledighetsraten. Ledigheten virker dempende på 
lønnstakernes reallønnsambisjon (ved å moderere nominelt lønnskrav) og stimulerende på bedriftenes 
reallønnsmål (siden ledigheten samvarierer negativt med aktivitetsnivået og ressursutnyttelsen i 
økonomien, og dermed virker dempende på produsentprisen). Der lønnstakernes fallende reallønnskurve 
og bedriftenes stigende reallønnskurve, begge som funksjon av ledighetsraten, krysser hverandre 
defineres en likevektsledighet kalt Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment eller NAIRU. 
Modellframstillingen resonnerer således at hvis ledighetsraten ikke konvergerer mot NAIRU over tid, så 
vil inflasjonen tilta hvis ledigheten ligger under NAIRU og avta hvis ledigheten ligger over. 
 
Vi formaliserer denne heuristikken bak NAIRU i en liten makromodell, og avviser at det bare er en 
eneste ledighetsrate som leder til en stabil og dermed “naturlig“ inflasjonsrate. De to statiske real-
lønnslikningene bygges inn i en dynamisk modell for en åpen økonomi, der ingen av partene har makt 
til å tvinge igjennom sin reallønnsmålsetting. I stedet justeres nominell lønn og produsentpris skrittvis, 
simultant og relativt til hverandre mot henholdsvis lønnstakernes og bedriftenes reallønnsmål. De to 
statiske reallønnslikningene i standardmodellen fungerer dermed som attraktorer på de faktiske lønns- 
og prisjusteringene i vår dynamiske modell. I denne justeringsprosessen er ikke ledighetsnivået 
avgjørende for hvorvidt lønns- og prisveksten konvergerer slik at både inflasjonen og reallønnen blir 
stabil. I stedet er det attraktorene og selve justeringsprosessen som sørger for at både lønns- og 
prisveksten tilpasser seg inflasjonen i utlandet. (Importprisen vektes sammen med produsent¬prisen til 
en konsumpris som påvirker lønnkravet). Dermed sikres en stabil reallønn og inflasjon for ethvert 
konstant nivå på en eksogent gitt ledighet. Når vi endogeniserer ledigheten blir den også stabil, men 
selve nivået avhenger av alle parametre og eksogene variable i modellen. Dermed er ledighetsnivået 
ikke naturlig, men en følge av dynamisk interaksjon så vel som statiske reallønnsmål.  
 
Den statiske standardmodellens heuristikk holder ikke i vår dynamiske modell, som dermed er ikke-
aksellerasjonistisk. Ved å la produsentenes justering av prisen påvirkes av tidligere prisaksellerasjon 
samt pålegge bestemte ekskluderende restriksjoner på en attraktor og på dynamikken får vi fram et 
spesialtilfelle av modellen der inflasjonen bare er stabil for et bestemt ledighetsnivå, et NAIRU. Grunnen 
til det er at ledigheten i denne modellversjonen må ta over (stabiliseringsfunksjonen) for visse variable 
som restriksjonene har eliminert fra modellen. Med begrenset kausalitet og redusert dynamik “gjenopp-
står” NAIRU. Denne artikkelen viser at dynamikk kan være kvalitativt og ikke bare kvantitativt viktig. 
En mer tolkningsbasert konklusjon er at dynamisk interaksjon mellom økonomiske aktører kan fortjene 
like mye oppmerksomhet som aktørenes egenskaper og rammebetingelser i økonomisk modellering.  
1 Introduction
Late in last millennium there was an interesting development in macroeconomic modelling
of equilibrium unemployment. First, macroeconomic implications of imperfect competition
with price-setting firms were developed in several papers and books, see e.g., Bruno (1979),
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Bruno and Sachs (1984) and Blanchard and Fisher (1989,
Chapter 8). Second, the economic theory of labour unions, pioneered by Dunlop (1944),
was extended and formalized in a game theoretic framework, see e.g. Nickell and Andrews
(1983), Oswald (1986), Hoel and Nymoen (1988). Models of European unemployment,
that incorporated elements from both these developments, appeared in Layard and Nickell
(1986), Carlin and Soskice (1990), Lindbeck (1993) and Layard et al. (2005).
The new macro model of unemployment is incontestably linked to Layard and Nickell
and their coauthors, but the framework is also often referred to as the Incomplete Compe-
tition Model (ICM) or, interchangeably, the wage-curve framework, to help distinguish it
from the earlier Phillips Curve Model (PCM)1. The ICM label seems apt since the model’s
defining characteristic is imperfect competition in both product and labour markets, see
e.g. Bårdsen and Nymoen (2003). The ICM model is included in leading textbooks in
macroeconomics, for example Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2010, Ch.13), Blanchard
(2009, Ch. 6), Burda and Wyplosz (2006, Ch. 12.4) and Miles and Scott (2002, Ch. 8).
Despite the diﬀerences, the ICM/wage-curve model and the PCM share an important
underlying premise, namely that it is the equilibrium rate of unemployment that reconciles
the conflict about the division of value-added between wage earners and firms. Both mod-
els take the view that the equilibrium or steady-state rate of unemployment is determined
by a limited number of factors that reflect structural aspects such as production technol-
ogy, union preferences and institutional factors (characteristics of the bargaining system,
the unemployment insurance system). Thus, in both theories, demand management and
monetary policy have only a short-term eﬀect on the rate of unemployment. In the (hy-
pothetical) situation in which all shocks are switched oﬀ, the rate of unemployment would
return to a unique equilibrium rate, called the natural rate or the NAIRU.2 In particular,
the ICM is a model of the natural rate both in its motivation and in its implications: «In
the long run, unemployment is determined entirely by long-run supply factors and equals
the NAIRU» (Layard et al. (1994, p 23)).
Both the ICM and the PCM represent the accelerationist view, that inflation increases
when actual unemployment is higher than the supply-side determined equilibrium rate,
and decreases when it is below that ‘natural’ rate. The accelerationist view has become
widely accepted in macroeconomic thinking. Specifically, it represents the main premise
for monetary policy, see for example King (1998). The formalization of the accelerationist
view is straight-forward in the PCM version of the theory. It is given by the restriction
known as dynamic homogeneity, and it implies that the long-run Phillips curve is vertical.
It is a diﬀerent matter for the ICM. Unlike the PCM, this is a static model from the outset,
and there is a gap between the strong heuristics of this model and the corresponding
explicit dynamic model of the wage-price spiral with accelerationist properties. In this
paper we attempt to bridge that gap.
We formalize the heuristics of the NAIRU in a dynamic version of the ICM model,
and refute the claim that only a certain level of unemployment secures a stable rate of
inflation. In our small and dynamic open-economy macro model, the two static real-wage
equations of the basic ICM serve as attractors in a wage-price spiral where neither the wage
earners (or unions) nor the firms have suﬃcient power to force through their real-wage
1The ICM acrynom may be confusing, in particular if taken to imply that the alternative Phillips curve
model represents perfect competition, cf. the New Keynesian Phillips curve (Gali and Gertler (1999)).
2 In this paper, the asymptotically stable equilibrium rate of unemployment, which is determined on the
supply side, correspond to a natural rate or to a NAIRU. The NAIRU depends on the (foreign) steady-state
rate of inflation, while a natural rate does not. Often we will simply use the term natural rate for brevity.
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target. Rather, the nominal wage and the producer price are both subject to simultaneous,
partial and reciprocal adjustments toward the their respective real-wage targets. In this
adjustment process no rate of unemployment is decisive for the convergence of the wage and
price inflation in order to make the real wage stable. It is not unemployment that secures
the coordination of wage and price growth, but the wage-price spiral. The attractors, i.e.
the real-wage targets, and the small and reciprocal adjustments cause the wage and price
growth to adapt to foreign inflation. (Foreign price is imported and weighted together
with domestic producer price into a consumer price which aﬀects the wage claim). This
secures a stable real-wage and a stable inflation for any rate of exogenous unemployment.
When we endogenize unemployment, it also becomes stable, but its stable rate depends
on all parameters and exogenous variables in the model. Hence, the unemployment level
is not “natural”, but a result of the static real-wage goals and the dynamic interactions of
variables in the wage-price spiral.
The heuristics of the standard ICM does not apply to our dynamic model. Our model
is non-accelerationistic. For our model to reflect the accelerationist view, we have to
impose certain restrictions on both causality and dynamics. First, we let the price adjust-
ment be influenced by previous price acceleration. Second, we impose certain excluding
restrictions on an attractor and on the dynamics. Then we get a special case of our model
where inflation is stable only for a certain rate of unemployment, i.e. a NAIRU. With
limited causality and reduced dynamics the NAIRU “rises again”. The reason is that
unemployment in this version of the model has to take over the stabilizing function of
the variables that the restrictions have excluded. This paper shows that dynamics can
be of qualitative as well as quantitative importance. A more interpretative conclusion is
that dynamic interaction between economic agents may deserve as much attention as their
individual and the economic framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the heuristics
of the ICM model, while section 3 contains our formalization of the dynamics and the
analysis of the stability properties of our dynamic ICM. The accelerationistic version of
the model is presented in section 3.5. In the concluding section 4 we briefly discuss the
relevance of our formalization for empirical work, which we think may be quite large.
2 The heuristic argument
The basic argument for the NAIRU is that unemployment serves as an arbiter between
conflicting real-wage claims from wage-earners and firms. The wage-price spiral will lead
to increasing inflation if unemployment is too low or falling inflation if unemployment is
too high. The NAIRU is the particular unemployment rate that equilibrates the real-wage
claims and stabilizes inflation. This was succinctly expressed by Layard et al. (1994, p.
18, authors’ italics):
Only if the real wage (W/P ) desired by wage setters is the same as that desired
by price setters will inflation be stable. And, the variable that brings about this
consistency is the level of unemployment. ... Thus, inflation will be stable only
if unemployment is at the appropriate equilibrium level.
The economic argument is developed from two theoretical propositions about price and
wage setting, often referred to as the price-curve and the wage-curve. In log-linearized
form, the price setting equation is
qf =mq +w − a− ϑu, (1)
with mq > 0 and ϑ ≥ 0. The variable qf in (1) refers to the theoretical price index deter-
mined by monopolistic firms in a situation characterized by known and stable growth in
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the hourly wage w, and in average labour productivity a. The profit maximizing condi-
tions imply that the mark-up coeﬃcientmq is positive. We follow custom and approximate
marginal labour costs with w − a− ϑu. With reference to Okun’s law3, we interpret the
rate of unemployment u as a proxy for capacity utilization. The often relevant case of
ϑ = 0 is called normal cost pricing.
Turning to the wage formation, we first note that there are several theoretical models
that have an important common implication: workers’ real-wage claims are negatively
related to the rate of unemployment. Such wage aspirations can result from aggregation
from individual wage agreements. But the institutional framework that we have in mind
is one where both claims and decisions about the real wage are moulded through a process
of collective bargaining. Therefore we define wb as the ‘bargained wage’, which is
wb = mw + q + a−' u+ ω (p− q) , (2)
with mw > 0, ' ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1. The right hand side contains the variables that
are expected to systematically influence on the bargained wage. The producer price q
and productivity a are central variables in the model of wage formation. This is well
established theoretically, by e.g., Nymoen and Rødseth (2003) and Forslund et al. (2008).
These variables are also found to be the main empirical determinants of the secular growth
in wages in bargaining based systems. The elasticity of q and a have been set to 1 in (2),
with reference to homogeneity of degree 1 in nominal variables.
The impact of unemployment on the bargained wage is given by the elasticity −' ≤ 0.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) provide evidence for the existence of an empirical law
that the value of ' is 0.1, which is the slope coeﬃcient of their wage-curve. Other
authors instead emphasize that the slope of the wage-curve is likely to depend on the
level of aggregation and on institutional factors. For example, one influential view holds
that economies with a high level of coordination and centralization is expected to be
characterized by a more sensitive responsiveness to unemployment (a higher ') than
uncoordinated systems, which give little incentive to solidarity in wage bargaining, cf.
Layard et al. (2005, Ch. 8).
Finally, equation (2) is seen to include the variable p − q, where p is the (log of) the
consumer price index. Because p− q is the diﬀerence between producer real wage w − q
and the consumer real wage w − p, this variable is referred to as the wedge: we ≡ p− q.
The elasticity of the wedge is ω. The theoretical status of the wedge is not entirely clear.
For example, one implication of the theory of collective bargaining (between labour unions
and profit maximizing firms) is that the consumer price p plays no role in determining the
bargaining outcome, see Forslund et al. (2008). The crux of the argument is that wage
bargaining is first and foremost about sharing of the value-added created by capital and
labour. All other considerations are of secondary importance in that theory. That be so
implies ω = 0 in (2). However, we shall see that the wedge (ω > 0) may serve a similar
arbiter role between conflicting real-wage aspirations as the unemployment rate.
It is not clear that the same bargaining model is equally relevant for understanding
wage setting in all sectors of the economy. In the service sectors, where unions may have
little bargaining power, wage setting may be dominated by so called eﬃciency wage con-
siderations. Interestingly, eﬃciency wage theory has qualitatively the same implications as
the bargaining model. Equation (2) is consistent with both theories, but the hypothesized
magnitude of the coeﬃcients are diﬀerent: The eﬃciency wage model predicts a larger
role for cost-of-living considerations. Thus ω > 0 may be used as one characteristic of
eﬃciency wage models. In summary, since we have in mind a model of the total economy
it is relevant to consider the behaviour of the model both when ω = 0, and 0 < ω < 1.4
3Okun’s “law” refers to the observed regularity that a change in unemployment is inversely proportional
to a change in real output, cf. e.g. Prachowny (1993).
4 In empirical studies of wage setting in manufacturing in the Nordic counrties, where union-firm bar-
gaining dominates, the hypothesis of ω = 0, is typically not rejected, see e.g., Nymoen and Rødseth (2003).
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The bargaining model interpretation also tells us that the mark-up termmw is conditioned
by diﬀerent institutional features of the wage-setting system. For example, a highly coor-
dinated or centralized system may be associated with a lower mw, all things equal, than in
a system with little coordination between the diﬀerent industries of the economy. Hence,
institutional changes can lead to shifts in the optimal wage level.
Since both (1) and (2) are homogenous of degree one in the nominal variables, we can
use them to define the real wage consistent with wage setting:
rwb ≡ wb − q = mw + ωwe+ a−' u (3)
where we ≡ p− q, and price setting:
rwf ≡ w− qf = −mq + a+ ϑu. (4)
Equation (3) represents the algebraic counterpart to the downward sloping curve in the
first graph in Figure 1, while (4) represents the upward sloping curve. For a given rate
of unemployment u, and without making further assumptions, there is no reason why
rwb = rwf . However, there are two additional elements in the Layard-Nickell model.
First, that no equilibrium with a constant rate of inflation is possible without the condition
rwbt = rw
f
t . The equilibrium rate of unemployment is found as u
∗ in Figure 1. Second, the
adjustment of the unemployment rate is the singular equilibrating mechanism that brings
about the necessary equalization of the competing claims.
Even though it is the wage and price levels that appear as variables in the model,
the heuristical explanation for the behaviour outside equilibrium is in terms of changes
in these two nominal variables: When the unemployment rate is too low for equilibrium
to exist: u < u∗ and rwb > rwf , then wage and price growth will be increasing. Hence,
inflation will be rising. Conversely, u < u∗ is assumed to concur with falling inflation.
Only when u = u∗ and rwb = rwf will the rates of change in wages and prices be constant
from one time period to the next. A common interpretation is that inconsistent wage and
price expectations of wage and price setters result in (de)accelerating wage and prices, and
that expectations remain inconstent as long as rwbt 9= rw
f
t . Heuristically, the only way
of maintaining a steady-state with constant inflation (non-accelerating price level) is by
securing that rwb = rwft . It is unemployment that reconciles the claims, see Layard et al.
(1994, Ch. 3), and brings about the equlibrium.
The “regions” with changing inflation are indicated in Figure 1. Since wage and
price inflation are both constant when u = u∗, the equilibrium unemployment rate u∗
is often referred to as the NAIRU level of unemployment. NAIRU stands for the Non
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment.5 The lower part of Figure 1 illustrates the
dynamic argument in the familiar Phillips-curve diagram, and this suggests that the main
contribution from the ICM is that it enriches the theory of the determination of u∗, while
the implied dynamics is exactly as in the “old” Phillips-curve. However, as we shall show
below, when we formulate an explicitly dynamic version of the ICM, there is no one-to-
one relationship between ICM dynamics and Phillips curve dynamics. They are in general
quite diﬀerent models of inflation.
The process leading to rising or falling inflation outside equilibrium is called the wage-
price spiral. When the expected real wage from wage-setting is higher than what the firms’
expect (at the given level of unemployment), firms will increase their nominal prices in
order to reduce the actual real wage in an attempt to restore profitability. As wage setters
However, in empirical studies that use aggregate (nation wide) data, a positive coeﬃcient of the wedge
is typically reported. This may be because other considerations than profit-sharing play an important
role in the publics sector and in some private sectors, i.e. eﬃciency wages, or because product prices and
productivity may be poorly measured.
5As many writers have commented, NAIRU is still a misnomer, since it is prices and wages that
(de)accelerate outside equilibrium, not inflation.
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Figure 1: Static determination of equilibrium real wage rw∗, unemployment u∗ and change in
inflation ∆2q∗ (= 0).
seek compensation by pressing for higher nominal wages, a wage-price spiral develops with
wages and prices chasing each other upwards. It is an important part of the heuristics that
wages and prices increase at a faster rate when ut < u∗, which motivates rising inflation
in the region of the figure where ut < u∗. However logical this heuristic may appear, it
is not inherent in a wage-price spiral. On the contrary, we shall show that there may be
alternative equilibrating mechanisms in the wage-price spiral that exempt unemployment
from a unique equilibrating rate u∗.
The two real-wage equations can be reformulated in terms of competing wage shares:
wsb ≡ rwb − a = mw + ωwe−' u and wsf ≡ rwf − a = −mq + ϑu, (5)
which show that the model can be interpreted in terms of competing claims on GDP. In
this interpretation, the labelling of the vertical axis in the first graph in Figure 1 can be
changed from real wage to wage share. One benefit of this interpretation is that the wage-
setting curve wsb and the price-setting curve wsf are invariant or Hicks-neutral: they do
not shift when productivity a changes over time. Consequently, the equilibrium rate of
unemployment is also independent of the productivity level.
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According to the heuristics of the theory there is another equally important spiral which
equilibrium unemployment eliminates: the wage-wage spiral. If unemployment is too low
(below u∗), wage-setters will try to raise their relative wage (rw or ws), and only if unem-
ployment is high enough will this wage-contamination process be halted. In equilibrium,
unemployment must be high enough to balance both types of competing claims.
The heuristics have been successful in shaping the belief that European unemployment
is mainly an equilibrium phenomenon and that policies to reduce unemployment should
target the socioeconomic determinants of the slopes of the wage and price curves (ϑ and
in particular ') and the mark-up coeﬃcients (mq and in particular mw). This has given
an important rationale for policies that take a structural and more long-term view on the
unemployment problem than the earlier policies that analysed unemployment within a
more short-term Keynesian framework. By the same argument, any concerns for nega-
tive long-term eﬀects of real-demand shocks on unemployment have been seen as largely
misplaced.
3 Modelling the heuristic dynamics of the wage-curve model
3.1 Equilibrium unemployment
The heuristics of the ICM equilibrium unemployment theory is dynamics, although the
two central equations (3) and (4) are static. Hence, the relevant interpretation of the
model is not that rwbt = rw
f
t in each time period, denoted by subscript t. Rather, if all
temporary shocks were switched oﬀ, then
ut −→
t→∞
u∗ =⇒
rwbt − rwft
 −→
t→∞
0
Unemployment moving toward its natural rate causes the two real-wage claims to converge.
A sensible interpretation of (3)-(4) is that they represent steady-state relationships:
rwbss(t) = mw + ωwess(t) + ass(t)−'u∗ and rwfss(t) = −mq + ass(t) + ϑu∗,
where pss(t), qss(t) and ass(t) are smooth and trending deterministic steady-state growth
paths. Since productivity is exogenous and assumed to be integrated of order 1, we can
write ass(t) = gat, where ga is the exogenous productivity growth rate, and a0 has been
set to zero. To preclude from the outset a deterministic trend in the steady-state wage-
share: wsss(t) ≡ rwss(t)−ass(t) or steady-state wedge wess(t) ≡ pss(t)−qss(t), we impose
wsss(t) = ws
∗. That implies rwss(t)− rwss(t− 1) = ga, and wess(t) = we∗. The model of
the steady state is now
wsb∗ = mw + ωwe∗ −'u∗ and wsf∗ ≡ −mq + ϑu∗. (6)
Setting wsb∗ = wsf∗ ≡ ws∗, we now have three steady-state variables ws∗, we∗ and u∗
and two equations. Without further assumptions, the steady-state is undetermined.
There are two solution to this problem. First, one can invoke the idea that the steady-
state value of the wedge is determined ‘from outside’. Usually this is done by requiring
that the current account has to be in balance in a macroeconomic equilibrium situation,
and assuming that this requirement determines an equilibrium real exchange rate, and
thus a unique steady-state wedge we∗ that can be taken as an exogenous variable in (6),
see Wright (1992). The expression for the NAIRU then becomes:
u∗ =
mq +mw
ϑ+' +
ω
ϑ+'we
∗ (7)
As mentioned above there are disagreement about the relevance of the wedge variable,
and subject to ω = 0, the equilibrium rate from the wage-price curve model becomes:
u∗ = (mq +mw) / (ϑ+') . (8)
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In the next sections we investigate whether a dynamic wage-price model implies a steady-
state rate of unemployment which is equal to the ICM/wage-curve NAIRU (7) or (8), and
we will refer to both expressions as we proceed.
3.2 The accelerationist view and a non-accelerationist alternative
Before we move to the model of the wage-price spiral, it can perhaps help to fix ideas that
the heuristics of the ICM-NAIRU model is consistent with the accelerationist view, which
means, following Solow (1999), that
...there is a degree of supply-demand balance of the economy as a whole, mea-
sured by the unemployment rate although capacity utilization or output-gap
can also be used, with the property that inflation speeds up if the economy is
tighter and decelerates if the economy is slacker. That special state of the real
economy is usually called the ‘natural rate’ of unemployment, or the NAIRU.6
Clearly, this view captures the gist of the ICM model to the point. It motivates the
formulation of an accelerationist model of the wage-price spiral. That model should have
the properties
ut −→
t→∞
uN ⇐⇒ ∆2qt −→
t→∞
0, (9)
where ∆qt = qt − qt−1 and where ∆2qt = ∆∆qt = ∆qt − ∆qt−1 represents inflation.
In words: a stable dynamic process for unemployment is impossible without constant
inflation, or conversely “inflation will be stable only if unemployment is at the appropriate
equilibrium level” (Layard et al. (1994, p 18)). We present such a model in section 3.5.
However, the problem with only analyzing the accelerationist version of the wage-
price spiral is that other relevant equilibrium paths for the rate of uenmployment may be
overlooked. As shown in Kolsrud and Nymoen (1998), a model of the wage price spiral
can be formulated where the existence of a steady-state for the wage share and constancy
of inflation does not depend on a particular long-run level of unemployment. Hence, the
more general property contained in that dynamic model of the wage-price spiral is not (9),
but instead
ut −→
t→∞
u =⇒ ∆2qt −→
t→∞
0. (10)
where u denotes any constant rate of unemployment. With reference to (10), the accel-
erationist view that the dynamic stability of the wage-price spiral requires that unem-
ployment has “natural rate dynamics” is refuted. Hence, instead of asserting either the
non-accelerationist or the accelerationist version from the outset, we next formulate a
dynamic model of the wage-price spiral that accommodates both views.
3.3 A dynamic model of the wage-price spiral
In this section we incorporate the two real-wage goals (3) and (4) in a dynamic model
that describe adjustments to the nominal wage wt and to the producer price qt, and thus
adjustments to the real wage wqt = wt − qt. The upper panel in Figure 1 shows the two
real-wage goals as long-run or static functions of unemployment u. In that static picture
the dynamic versions of the real wage can be thought of as a time path for the realized
real wage superimposed on the two real-wage lines already drawn. The question is then:
does the dynamics reflect the heuristics? Do the model dynamics converge to the static
solution (u∗, rw∗)? Is there a unique NAIRU = u∗, or does the dynamic model possess
other mechanisms for reconciling the real-wage conflict?
6Solow is not comfortable with the accelerationist model. He argued that the evidence of the model is
extremely limited.
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The model of the wage-price spiral we have in mind is a simultaneous equations model
for the nominal wage and price adjustments. Simultaneity is used as a convenient way
of representing the two-way causation between wage and price. For simplicity we ignore
error terms since they serve no purpose in this paper. The model is
∆qt = cq + ψqw∆wt + ψqpi∆pit − ψquut + θqecm
f
t−1 + ψqq∆2qt−1, (11)
∆wt = cw + ψwq∆qt + ψwp∆pt − ψwuut − θwecmbt−1, (12)
∆pt = φ∆qt + (1− φ)∆pit, (13)
where pi is an import price index. All parameters are non-negative, and 0 < φ < 1 reflects
the openness of the economy7. To keep the model small and focused we do not include
an equation for pi. We assume that pit, like productivity a, follows a random walk with
a positive drift parameter gpi. Hence both import prices and productivity are exogenous
and non-stationary variables in the model.
To keep the model simple and analytically tractable we have limited the dynamics to
a single lag, with one exception. We represent price-acceleration explicitly by including
∆2qt−1 ≡ ∆qt−1 −∆qt−2, so that previous period’s price acceleration may stimulate the
current price change (11). A more general model could include both leads and more lags
of the variables due to expectations and overlapping contracts, but such a model would
be analytically too complicated.
The wage- and price-setting curves in Figure 1 are aﬀecting the actual wage and price.
The curves express workers’ and firms’ real-wage goals, rwft and rw
b
t , and serve as at-
tractors in the growth process of nominal price (11) and nominal wage (12) through the
equilibrium correcting terms
ecmft ≡ rwt − rw
f
t = q
f
t − qt = (wt − qt − at) − ϑut +mq, (14)
ecmbt ≡ rwt − rwbt = wt −wbt = (wt − qt − ιat)− ω (pt − qt) +' ut −mw. (15)
If θw = θq = 0, we have a Phillips curve model (PCM). If θw > 0 or θq > 0, one or both
of the theoretical variables rwbt and rw
f
t of the Layard-Nickell ICM enter as attractors in
an equilibrium correction formulation.
The model (11)-(13) has four contemporaneous endogenous variables: ∆wt, ∆pt, ∆qt
and ut, but only three equations. Without further assumptions or restrictions, the model
is undetermined. Next, we discuss two determined models. The first represents the non-
accelerationist view, while the second is an attempt to represent the accelerationist view
which is central in the heuristics of the natural rate.
3.4 A non-accelerationist model
In a stable non-accelerationist model there is per definition no need of a term including
accelerating prices ∆2qt−1, and we set ψqq = 0. For simplicity, and with no loss of
generality, we also set ψwu = ψqu = 0, so that only the lagged unemployment rate enters
as a variable in (11)-(13) via the equilibrium correction terms ecmft−1 and ecm
b
t−1. We first
consider the case where unemployment follows a process which is exogenous with respect
to the outcome of the wage-price spiral: unemployment is not Granger-caused by inflation
or any derived variables such as the wage share. This is not meant as a model that we
would preferer to use for forecasting or policy analysis, since there are so many channels
through which unemployment becomes linked to real wages and the real excange rate. We
will use it to show by a counter example that there is in general no reason to believe that
there is a singular natural rate of unemployment which is consistent with stable inflation
in an acceptable model of the wage-price spiral.
7Note that, due to the log-form, φ = im/(1− im) where im the import share in private consumption.
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We also review the non-accelerationist solution when unemployment is Granger-caused in
the sense just mentioned, see Kolsrud and Nymoen (2010).8
3.4.1 The solution with exogenous (targeted) unemployment
The key to the full dynamic solution of the wage-price inflation model (11)-(13) is to re-
express the model as a dynamic system that determines time paths for two real variables:
the wage-share ws and the real exchange rate re ≡ pi − q. When re is determined, the
wedge variable we = p− q is also determined, since we = (1−φ) re. In the Layard-Nickell
ICM, the parameter restriction ι = 1 eliminates a deterministic trend from the equilibrium
rate of unemployment. The restriction ι = 1 plays an important role in the wage-price
spiral model (11)-(13) as well, and that is to eliminate a deterministic trend in the wage
share wst. The trend would result if the wage and price adjustments were influenced by
two diﬀerent productivity corrected real-wages, i.e. ∆q being influenced by w − q − a in
(11) while ∆w were influenced by w− q− ιa (with i < 1) in (12). Hence, in the following,
we condition on ι = 1, and (11) and (12) become
∆qt = (cq + θqmq) + ψqw∆wt + ψqpi∆pit − θqϑut−1 + θq wst−1, (16)
∆wt = (cw + θwmw) + ψwq∆qt + ψwp∆pt − θw ut−1 − θw'wst−1 + θw ωwet−1, (17)
Importantly, ut−1 is a predetermined and exogenous variable in the model. If the
model was accelerationist, the system would only be stable if (by coincidence) ut → uN as
t→ ∞. But, as the analysis in Kolsrud and Nymoen (2010) shows, the solutions for wst
and ret are dynamically stable for any stationary rate of unemployment. Their conditional
expectations converge to constant levels that are independent of starting values, as long
as the following suﬃcient conditions hold simultaneously: (i) wage growth is influenced
by the wage share: θw > 0, and the wedge: ω > 0, (ii) price adjustments are influenced
by the wage-share: θq > 0, or the wage growth: ψqw > 0, (iii) there is not both a
price Phillips curve (θq = 0) and full pass-through of wage growth (ψqw = 1), hence
θq + (1 − ψqw) > 0, and (iv) there is not a certain kind of dynamic wage and price
homogeneity, hence ψqw(φψwp + ψwq) < 1. These stability restrictions can be combined
and simplified to a single inequality:
0 < θw ω

θq + ψqw(1− ψqw)
 
1− ψqw[φψwp0 + ψwq]

, (18)
which does not place any restrictions on the path followed by ut. As long as ut follows any
linear stochastic process that is stationary, the system (11)-(13) is stable in the sense that
the steady-state wage and price growth rates align with the steady-state growth rates of
productivity (ga) and foreign prices (gpi) to make the steady-state real exchange rate and
the wage share stable:
ress = ess gpi + bss ga +
ϑ+'
ω(1− φ) u
∗ − dss, (19)
wsss = ξss gpi − βss ga + ϑu∗ − δss. (20)
The composite coeﬃcients and constant terms (with subscript ss) are all positive except
bss, which may be zero or negative for non-realistical parameter values. It also follows from
the definition of the real exchange rate and the wage share that the dynamically stable
steady-state values of price and wage inflation are E[∆pt] = E[∆qt] = E[∆pit] = gpi, and
E[∆wt] = E[∆qt] + E[∆at] = gpi + ga. Diﬀerent stable unemployment rates cause diﬀerent
stable real exchange rates and diﬀerent stable wage shares, but steady-state domestic
inflation remains equal to steady-state foreign inflation.
8They extend the results in Bårdsen et al. (2005, Ch. 6) and Kolsrud and Nymoen (1998)
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In the wage-price spiral (16)-(17) it is not the unemployment level that checks the wage
and price growth rates so that the wage share ws and the real exchange rate re ≡ pi− q
are stable. The stabilizing mechanism is the wage share w − q − a and the wedge p − q
(which is proportional to the real exchange rate re = we/(1− φ)) influencing the growth
in their constituent variables w and q. The wage share aﬀects the growth in both w and
q, while the real exchange rate influences the growth in w and through simultaneity also
the growth in q. Since the levels of the two real variables (ws, re) aﬀect the growth of
their constituent endogenous variables (w, q) the real variables themselves become stable.
Hence, it is the dynamic nominal adjustment process informed by (whatever) real levels
that is the stabilizing mechanism. The actual levels of the stable ws and rw depend on
the exogenous growth rates gpi and ga, and on all parameters in the wage-price spiral
(11)-(13). Stability in a dynamic model is clearly a more complicated and less intuitive
concept than stability in a static model, reflected by Figure 1 That is illustrated by Figure
2, which shows dynamic simulations of the non-accelerationsist model with exogenous
unemployment.
A no-wedge restriction ω = 0 in the wage-price spiral prevents domestic inflation from
aligning with foreign inflation, hence E[∆pt] 9= E[∆qt] 9= E[∆pit] = gpi. This makes the
real exchange rate ret trend and the steady-state expression (19) invalid, while the wage
share is stable.
3.4.2 Solution with endogenous unemployment
Since equations (3)-(4) correspond to the wage and price setting curves in Figure 1, it is
tempting to extend the system (11)-(13) with the unemployment equation
ut = cu + αut−1 + θu(rwbt−1 − rw
f
t−1), with 0 < θu < 1, (21)
since this seems to capture the heuristics: ut increases when rwbt−1 > rw
f
t−1, reduces when
rwbt−1 < rw
f
t−1, and is stable if rw
b
t−1 = rw
f
t−1. However, after substituting for the two
real-wage goals, the resulting dynamic equation ut = [α− θu(' + ϑ)]ut−1 + θuωwet−1 +
θu(mw+mq) shows a positive eﬀect of the wedge on unemployment. It reflects directly that
the wedge increases the workers’ real-wage goal rwbt−1 but does not aﬀect the producers’
real-wage goal rwft−1. This property of the attractors (the static real-wage goals) should
not dominate the dynamics of unemployment in a way which does not make economic
sense. The wedge is proportional to the real exchange rate or price competitiveness:
we = (1−φ)re, and a real depreciation should reduce rather than increase unemployment.
This example suggests that heuristics (as in section 2) may be misleading in dynamic
models.
Simultaneity in the wage-price spiral (16)-(17) makes the wedge influence both the
nominal wage wt and the producer price qt, and thus both real-wage goals rwbt ≡ wbt − qt
and rwft ≡ wt−q
f
t (the time subscript makes either goal a dynamic variable which changes
with the development of the whole dynamic system). Instead of closing the model with
(21), we use the following very simple unemployment equation where the real exchange
rate has the “right” sign:
ut = cu + αut−1 − ρ ret−1 + εu,t, with 0 < α < 1 and ρ > 0. (22)
Kolsrud and Nymoen (2010) rationalize this intuitively plausible reduced form equation
by job search theory and the concepts of matching and job destruction. They calculate
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the following steady-state when (18) holds:
re = ess gpi + b

ss±
ga + d

ss±
, (23)
ws = ξss±
gpi − βss ga − δss±
, (24)
u = − ess gpi − bss±
ga + dss. (25)
Again, all composite coeﬃcients are positive, except where the label ± indicates that a
zero value or a negative sign is numerically possible. In the unemployment equation (25)
the coeﬃcients are
ess = ρ [θq(1− ψwq − ψwp) + θw(1− ψqw − ψqpi)]/(θq θw Ω),
bss = ρ (θq − θw ψqw)/(θq θw Ω),
dss = [cu ω(1− φ) + ρ (mw +mq + cw/θw + cq/θq)]/Ω,
and Ω = ω (1 − φ) (1 − α) + ρ (' + ϑ). Contrary to the case with exogenous unem-
ployment, a no-wedge restriction ω = 0 does not make the real exchange rate trend. The
reason is that the real exchange rate influences producer price growth through endogenous
unemployment (22).
When unemployment (22) interacts with the wage and price formation, there is an
equilibrium rate of unemployment given by (25). It depends on the trends in foreign
inflation and domestic productivity, and all the parameters of the model. The latter
means that short-term dynamics and long-term stability are not independent. Rigidities or
frictions that cause partial and lagged adjustments of wage and prices and unemployment
in the short-run also influence the long-run levels of the real variables (23)-(25). In the
dynamic model (13), (16), (17) and (22), there is no “natural” level of unemployment
that depends only on structural elements like technology and preferences, represented
by the parameters in the price and wage goals (1)-(2): mq,ϑ and mw, ι = 1,',ω. The
equilibrium or long-run level of unemployment also depends on the dynamic interaction
of the economic agents (producers, workers/unions, etc.), represented by parameters of
change-variables, like θq,ψwq,ψwp and θw,ψqw,ψqpi. Finally, the long-run depends on the
openness of the economy φ, and on the unemployment process cu,α and ρ.
Figure 2 shows four dynamic simulations of the non-accelerationsist model: with
exogenous and endogenous unemployment, and without and with random shocks. All
simulations start from the same equilibrium, and are subject to the same permanent
exogenous shock to unemployment, by a change in the constant cu. The panels show
bivariate time-trajectories for (ut, wst) and (ut,∆2qt). All models simulations use the
same parameterization, which is guided by econometric results in Bårdsen et al. (2005).
The parameter values are: mq = 0.31, ϑ = 0.065, mw = 0.46, ' = 0.1, ω = 0.5,
θq = 0.13,ψqw = 0.4,ψqpi = 0.4, θw = 0.12, ψwq = 0.5, ψwp = 0.2, φ = 0.6, α = 0.85 and
ρ = 0.1. The permanent shock to unemployment is of size 0.1, and shifts cu from one value
to another. The values of the constants cq, cw and cu diﬀer between the simulations with
exogenous unemployment and the simulations with exogenous unemployment in order for
all simulations to start from the same equilibrium. Figure 2 clearly illustrates that there
is no singular NAIRU.
3.5 An accelerationist model of the wage-price spiral
The previous section showed that a model of the wage-price spiral that incorporates the
wage and price setting curves of the ICM as attractors for the adjustments does not have
accelerationistic properties: the rate of unemployment may follow any stable dynamic
process with a long-run mean u¯. A structural break that changes the steady-state level
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Figure 2: Phase diagrams of dynamic versus static determination of equilibria in the non-
accelerationist model. Figure 2 is Figure 1 with model simulations superimposed. In the upper panel
the static wage curve wsb is shifted rightward all the way to the dashed line by a permanent shock to
exogenous unemployment (22) (ρ = 0 makes ut autonomous and thus exogenous, denoted by subscript
x). With endogenous unemployment (subscript e) the same shift to cu in (22) (now with ρ > 0) is partly
countered by a change in the equilibrium wedge we, hence wsb shifts less, to the solid line.
The upper panel shows four dynamic simulations, all with the same plausible parameterization guided
by econometric results. The simulations diﬀer by exogenous vs. endogenous unemployment, and none vs.
random shocks. All simulations start in the steady-state (u∗, ws∗) = (1.38,−0.22). The simulations are
displayed as curves traced by the pair (ut, wst) through time as the variables move from one steady-state
to another in response to the shock to unemployment. The smooth curves are simulations without ran-
dom shocks, while the ragged graphs are simulations with shocks. The leftmost and heavier graphs are
simulations with endogenous unemployment, while the rightmost and lighter graphs are simulations with
exogenous unemployment. Note that the dynamic equilibrium (uss, wsss) is considerably less than the
static equilibrium (u∗, ws∗), and that the dynamic equilibrium is close to the price curve wsf and far from
the wage curve wsb, both with endogenous and exogenous unemployment. Note that the static equilibrium
is never an attractor for the dynamic process.
The lower panel shows the corresponding time-trajectories of the unemployment-inflation pair
(ut,∆2qt). Inflation is unstable only during the transition between the equilibria.
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of unemployment will influence the solution and the steady state values of the wage share
and the real exchange rate, but the steady-state rate of inflation will not be subject to a
structural break9. The interactive wage and price adjustment prosesses (16)-(17) relieve
unemployment of mitigating the conflict between the real-wage goals.
In this section we still incorporate the real-wage conflict into the model, but not only in
the form of competing real-wage goals. We also let the real-wage conflict be expressed
by the dynamics. In order to do that and at the same time keep the model simple and
managable, we work only with the wage-price spiral (11)-(13), and include no separate
unemployment equation like (22). Instead we consider ψqu > 0 and/or ψwu > 0 in (11)-
(13). Then the current rate of unemployment enters as a variable in the wage-price spiral
in addition to the lagged rate.
The model of the wage price spiral then has four contemporaneous endogenous vari-
ables: ∆wt, ∆pt,∆qt and ut, but only three equations. Hence, the model is undetermined.
Formalization of the heuristics of the ICM therefore requires restrictions on the wage-
price spiral. One possibility is to set θq = θw = 0 which gives a Phillips Curve Model
(PCM). If the PCM is restricted so that the implied long-run Phillips curve is vertical,
and unemployment is postulated to be a function of the lagged wage share, then the rate
of unemployment will have natural-rate dynamics, see Bårdsen et al. (2005, Ch. 4.2) This
gives an accelerationist model which corresponds to the standard AD-AS model in macro-
economic textbooks, and also the north-American triangular model of inflation Gordon
(1997). Intermediate cases are also possible. For example, Bårdsen and Nymoen (2009)
show that with θq = 0 but θw > 0, the wage-price spiral is stable, and the steady-state
rate of unemployment may be aﬀected by permanent demand shocks.
However, in this paper we seek an accelerationist model with both θq > 0 and θw > 0,
since this ensures that the two wage claims equations are fully integrated in the wage-price
spiral, in accordance with the heuristical explanation of the natural rate dynamics. We
obtain that accelerationist model by imposing the following restrictions: ψwq = ψqw = 1
make domestic price and wage changes have simultaneous and full impact on each other,
while ψqpi = ψwp = 0 eliminate direct eﬀects of import-price inflation and consumer-price
inflation on the wage inflation and producer-price inflation. These restrictions suﬃce for
the real-wage conflict to bear directly on the dynamics.
The parameter restrictions change the dynamic wage-price spiral to
∆qt = −θq(rwft−1 − rwt−1) + ψqq∆2qt−1 +∆wt − ψquut + cq + εq,t, (26)
∆wt = θw(rwbt−1 − rwt−1) +∆qt − ψwuut + cw + εw,t. (27)
Writing the change in the real wage as ∆rwt = ∆wt −∆qt, we obtain:
∆rwt = θq(rwft−1 − rwt−1)− ψqq∆2qt−1 + ψquut − cq − εq,t, (28)
∆rwt = θw(rwbt−1 − rwt−1)− ψwuut + cw + εw,t. (29)
Substituting (3) and (4) for the real-wage goals rwbt−1 and rw
f
t−1, and ignoring the residual
terms, yield
rwt = (1−θq) rwt−1+θq (−mq + at−1 + ϑut−1)−ψqq∆2qt−1+ψquut−cq, (30)
rwt = (1−θw) rwt−1+θw(mw + ωwet−1 + at−1 −'ut−1)−ψwuut+cw. (31)
These equations express a conflict between real-wage dynamics as well as a conflict be-
tween real-wage claims. The two equations provide solutions for the two contemporaneous
9In case of no wedge and exogenous unemployment, the steady-state inflation rate will shift when
unemployment does. The no-wedge restriction ω = 0 cancels information about price levels in the wage-
price spiral (16)-(17). Then the domestic price q no longer gets leveled with the import price pi, hence the
real exchange rate pi− q becomes a trending (non-stationary) variable.
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variables, rwt and ut given previous period values for all variables. Since price accelera-
tion ∆2qt−1 is lagged and thus predetermined, we may say that it is the current rate of
unemployment ut which solves the conflicts.
The model (30)-(31) can be written as a first order vector autoregression (VAR) for
wst and ut. The productivity growth ∆at is exogenous, and the wedge wet−1 and the
price acceleration ∆2qt−1 are predetermined variables in the VAR. Its reduced form is
wst = r11wst−1 + r12ut−1 + p11wet−1 −∆at − p12∆2qt−1 + p13, (32)
ut = r21wst−1 − r22ut−1 + p21wet−1 + p22∆2qt−1 + p23, (33)
with coeﬃcients:
r11 = 1−

θqψwu + θwψqu

/Ψ > 0, r21 = [θq − θw]/Ψ,
r12 =

ϑθqψwu −'θwψqu

/Ψ, r22 = [ϑ θq +'θw]/Ψ > 0,
p11 = ω θwψwu/Ψ ≥ 0, p21 = ω θw/Ψ ≥ 0,
p12 = ψwuψqq/Ψ > 0, p22 = ψqq/Ψ > 0,
p13 =

(cw + θwmw)ψqu−(cq + θqmq)ψwu

/Ψ, p23 = [cw + θwmw + cq + θqmq]/Ψ > 0,
andΨ = ψqu+ψwu. The ICM-restrictions reduce the wage-price spiral (11)-(13) to a model
of the wage share ws (32) and the unemployment rate u (33) conditional on exogenous
productivity growth ∆a and possibly two quasi-exogenous variables, the wedge we and
price acceleration ∆2q, which are not being determined by the ICM, but are nevertheless
closely linked to it. If ψqq∆2qt−1 9= 0 then E[∆qt] 9= E[pit] = gpi, and the wedge becomes
unstable. If ω > 0 the wedge (or the proportional real exchange rate re = we/(1 − φ))
also aﬀects the wage share and the unemployment rate, and both become unstable. In the
case of no wedge (p11 = 0), the wage share ws ≡ w−q−a might be stable if nominal wage
growth follows price growth, such that E[∆wt] = E[∆qt] + ga and E

∆2wt

= E

∆2qt

.
Stability of the wage share and unemployment thus requires ψqq = 0, which is not
an option in this accelerationist case, or no wedge10 (ω = 0 ⇒ p11 = p21 = 0) and
E[∆wt] = E[∆qt]+ga and E

∆2wt

= E

∆2qt

. These nominal variables are not variables
in the ICM (32)-(33). In addition, the eigenvalues of the dynamic mapping of the wage
share and unemployment rate,
λ = 1
2
(r11 − r22)± 1
2
(r11 + r22)
t
1 + 4 r12r21/ (r11 + r22)
2,
both have to be less than 1 in magnitude. That might well be the case for realistic
parameter values. If so, the steady-state solutions are
ws∗ = β ga + γ∆2q∗ − δ and u∗ = b ga − c∆2q∗ − d, (34)
with ga ≡ E[∆at] and
β = (1 + r22) /R =

ψqu + ψwu + ϑ θq +'θw

/(RΨ),
γ = [p12(1 + r22)− p22r12]/R = ψqq (ψwu +'θw) /(RΨ);
δ = (p13(1 + r22) + p23r12) /R = [(cw + θwmw) (ψqu + ϑ θq)Ψ
− (cq + θqmq) (ψwuΨ+ 2ϑ θqψwu +'θw

ψwu − ψqu

)]/

RΨ2

,
b = r21/R = (θq − θw) /(RΨ),
c = [p22(1− r11)− p12r21]/R = ψqqθw/(RΨ),
d = [p23(1− r11) + p13r21]/R = [(cw + θwmw) θq + (cq + θqmq) θw]/RΨ,
10 If wage bargaining is first and foremost about sharing of the value-added created by capital and labour
then ω = 0 is a logical implication, see Forslund et al. (2008).
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where R = r12r21− (1+ r22)(1− r11) = 1−θqθw('+ϑ). Note that ∆2q∗ 9= 0⇒ ∆2p∗ 9= 0
according to the consumer price definition (13). Equation (34) says that there is a steady-
state rate of unemployment for any constant price acceleration∆2q∗ or ∆2p∗. When there
is no price acceleration the equation defines what can be interpreted as the NAIRU:
uN = b ga − d.
From the inverse relationship between unemployment and change in inflation implied
by the unemployment equation (34) we extract the following formalization of the acceler-
ationist view:
∆2q∗ = 1
c
(b ga − u∗ − d) = −
1
c

u∗ − uN

⎧
⎨
⎩
> 0 if u∗ < uN ,
= 0 if u∗ = uN ,
< 0 if u∗ > uN .
(35)
4 Discussion
We have seen that care must be taken when formalizing the heuristics of the ICM/wage-
price model of unemployment (aka Layard-Nickell model). The formalization requires
specific restrictions on the model of the wage-price spiral that completely remove nominal
rigidity. Without these restrictions, it no longer follows logically that the wage-price spiral
model is accelerationistic, and that the rate of unemployment logically has to adjust to
a NAIRU in order to stabilize inflation. Adding an independent dynamic unemployment
equation to the wage-price spiral gives a model of equilibrium unemployment, but not an
accelerationist one. To arrive at an accelerationsist model, the unemployment dynamics
must be implied in full by the equations of the (restricted) model of the wage-price spiral.
Our analysis implies that care must be taken when the wage curve theory of equilibrium
unemployment is taken to data. The approach that uses time series data to estimate the
wage and price schedules in Figure 1, and then proceeds to solve those estimated equations
for the NAIRU, rests on bold assumptions about the properties of the model of the wage
price spiral, and also on the exact form of how unemployment reacts to the real-wage gaps.
Often in empirical studies of this type, the dynamic process for the rate of unemployment
is not formulated explicitly, and the necessary conditions for the empirical relevance of
natural rate dynamics are therefore not evaluated. For example, finding that the rate of
unemployment is weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters of the wage and price
equations will refute the accelerationist interpretation. More specifically, the role of the
estimated natural rate as an attractor for actual unemployment is often not tested. Since
such approaches do not question the nature of the underlying equilibrium mechanism, it
is diﬃcult to assess precisely what they find out about equilibrium unemployment.
Another branch of the empirical literature aims at estimating a reduced form of un-
employment which is consistent with the heuristics of the model, preferably with macro
panel data, in order to have variation in institutional indicators that may influence the
wage and price mark-ups and therefore also unemployment. The above analysis is relevant
for the specification of these models. For example, the order of dynamics should at least
be of second order, since this is implied by first order dynamics in the wage and price
equations. We also note that according to our formalization, there is no way to rationalize
the inclusion of demand-shocks variables in these econometric equations. This is because
the shock terms in the two equations of the wage-price spiral have the interpretation as
supply shocks. In the final equation for unemployment, there is no room for other shocks.
It is interesting to note that in the existing literature we find that demand shocks are
included alongside variables that represent supply shocks, see Nickell et al. (2005). In one
sense this only confirms that it is diﬃcult to formulate dynamic models that are consistent
with the static ICM framework.
Finally, the analysis has implications for macroeconomic model building. Specifically,
we show that the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate is not determined by the wage
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and price setting curves as long as the wage-price spiral is non-accelerationist. That is a
good reason for building larger systems of equations, even if the first objective and primary
concern is the analysis of wages, prices and unemployment, see Bårdsen et al. (2005) for
discussions. Conversely, no inconsistencies or issues about “overdetermination” arise from
adding a separate equation for the rate of unemployment, where demand variables may
enter, to the wage-price setting equations. The enlarged model will have a steady state,
subject to conditions that can be tested. The equilibrium rate of unemployment implied
by this type of model is not of the natural rate type, since factors from the demand side
may have lasting eﬀects (depending on the nature of the shocks and on policy responses).
Apart from in the , The equilibrium rate of unemployment is a system property (except
in the accelerationist model of the wage price spiral), and it seems worthwhile to develop
that perspective in models of the macroeconomy.
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